

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

15 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Intelligence and Posture Planning; Speech by Dr. Ivan Selin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis. Given at Military Operations Research Symposium, Tuesday, 12 December 1967.

The main theme of Dr. Selin's speech was the influence of the Soviet threat upon force planning and our understanding of the influences upon Soviet behavior (in force planning and programming) and Soviet reaction to U.S. policies and actions.

He repeated a view (or even the hope) previously expressed by both Mr. McNamara and Dr. Enthoven. It is embodied in the question, if we vary our policies, how will the Soviets react? Also, "Can we do anything at all to influence Soviet behavior?"

The current OSD view of these queries has always been a positive one, i.e., "the Soviets are intelligent men and for the most part act rationally and in their own best interests. Our actions and policies affect their interests. Hence, if we analyze our alternative policies and likely Soviet reactions, we can select an optimum policy." The latter point is often expressed as, "What's good for us is not necessarily bad for the Soviets." (I have never heard this non-sum zero or bargaining game expression used in the reverse proposition.)

Thus, Dr. Selin noted that there had been a change in emphasis in the needs of users. He indicated that the White House and the U. S. Commands essentially required current intelligence while OSD posture planners required more detailed threat estimates and projections.

Dr. Selin categorized three time periods in threat presentation.

- (1) The Near Term-the next one to two years in which our ability to change our posture was nearly zero.
- (2) Mid Term - three to five years in the future in which our intelligence needs are greatest in terms of the impact on decision making.

~~SECRET~~

- (3) Long Term - five to twenty years in the future in which we need to look at the range of threats and our R&D options.

25X1

Dr. Selin was mildly critical of Intelligence's response to the OSD planners needs. He pointed out that intelligence views in general lacked specificity and although dealing with the likely threat in the mid-term and long-term, failed to indicate the likelihood of our knowledge of threat changes related to our expanding uncertainty.

He complimented CIA on the organization of OSR (which he characterized as being devoted to the systems analysis approach.) He also bluntly stated the service tendencies to inflate threat projections in terms of their own hardware interests.

In discussing types of threats, Dr. Selin categorized them as (1) Likely Threats - which intelligence produced (2) Unlikely but possible threats, which he claimed the posture planner produced and used to develop his hedge against uncertainty, and (3) Response Threats - those which the Soviets might develop in response to U.S. force posture changes.

Dr. Selin stated that more research and analysis was required into Soviet decision making and decision makers. He noted that his own office was funding a small project in this area (I believe with Andy Marshall and Rand.)

Finally, returning again to the problem of influencing Soviet behavior and our analysts of this area, he mentioned the STRATAC study effort in OSD as an example of strategic considerations.

To me Dr. Selin's view of intelligence can best be summed up in his statement, "The question is not one of knowing what they (the Soviets) are going to do (in the mid and long term) but one of knowing (through explicit analysis) what makes sense to the Soviets (in terms of their best interests.)"

A/D/DCI/NPE

25X1

SECRET